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Introduction 
The issue of torture has once again become a prominent issue owing to the recent disclosure by former 
U.S. President George W. Bush, who indicated in an interview with an English newspaper that he had 
authorised the use of ‘waterboarding’ during the interrogation of suspected terrorists.1 The question as to 
whether or not coercive interrogational techniques should be used has several different dimensions,2 the 
legal aspects of which are the least straightforward when explored. In international law, the prohibition 
against torture is clear and unambiguous: the ban is absolute,3 and under no circumstances, even in the 
context of military operations, can its use ever be defended.4 In the context of military operations, torture 
is also classified as both a crime against humanity5 and a war crime.6 Torture as a crime against humanity 
can be committed during times of peace or during war, whereas war crimes are only committed where 
there is a link to armed conflict.7 However, the common thread which binds the two in respect of military 
personnel is that either can be committed by officials acting in official capacities.’8 In spite of this there 
                                                            
* Teaching Fellow in Scots law, University of Abertay Dundee 
1  B MacIntyre, George W. Bush: Waterboarding saved London from attacks, The Times, 8 November 
2010.  
2  See inter alia Ginbar, Why not torture terrorists? Moral, practical and legal aspects of the ‘ticking bomb’ 
justification for torture Oxford University Press, 2003; M Bagaric and J Clarke, Not enough official torture in the 
world? The circumstances in which torture is morally justifiable 39 U.S.F. L. Rev. 581-616 2004-2005; M Evans, 
Getting to grips with torture, I.C.L.Q. 2002, 51(2) 265-383. 
3  See inter alia, article 2 UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 1984; Article 3, European Convention on Human Rights 1950; Article 7, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. 
4  Article 2(2) and 2(3), UN Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment 1984. 
5  Article 7(f), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998. 
6  Article 8(2)(a)(ii), ibid.. 
7  Article 2, Geneva Convention IV 1949. 
8  A Cassese, International law, Oxford University Press, 2005 at 445. 
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have been different efforts to circumvent the ban,9 in particular through the use of ex post facto defences. 
Initially, the use of such defences in the context of crimes against humanity was rejected by a decision from 
the International Criminal tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,10 (ICTY) which held that there was no 
availability of the defence of duress or necessity in respect of crimes against humanity, specifically murder. 
The Statute of the ICTY, drafted in 1991, makes no provision for any form of defence and nor for any 
circumstances which could exclude criminal liability. However, in the drafting of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court 1998, provision was made for the exclusion of criminal liability for crimes 
against humanity and war crimes where, inter alia, ‘the conduct…has been caused by duress resulting from a 
threat of imminent death, or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against that person or another 
person, and the person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat.’11 The action taken must not 
generate a greater harm than that which is sought to be avoided and can be created by another person or 
‘circumstances beyond…the control’12 of the personnel justifying the commission of the crime. Further to 
this, the Israeli case of the Public Committee of Israel against Torture v State of Israel13 held that it would 
be possible for State investigators to use the Israeli defence of necessity, provided for within the domestic 
penal code,14 if indicted for the crime of torture. 
 
This would therefore appear to be a relatively straightforward issue, were it not for article 2 of the UN 
Convention Against Torture 1987, which rejects the idea that any ‘exceptional circumstances whatsoever, 
whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be 
invoked as a justification of torture.’ The recent academic commentary on the use of the defence of 
necessity, distinguishing between a justification for torture and an excuse,15 provides a useful insight into 
the defence itself. It is of vital importance that the military is aware of and understand this distinction, and 
its consequences for personnel. This paper seeks to analyse the distinction from a military perspective, 
drawing on international and national legal sources.16 The principal aim of this analysis is to explore the 
possible provision of such defences for war crimes and crimes against humanity, in order to clarify the 
                                                            
9  For academic debate on methods of avoiding the prohibition, see A Harel and A Sharonis., What 
is really wrong with torture? J.I.C.J. 2008, 6(2), 241-259 and in particular, A Dershowitz, Shouting Fire: Civil 
liberties in a turbulent age, Little Brown and Co, 2002 
10  Erdemovic, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 14 April 1997 (Case no IT-96-22-A). 
11  Article 31(1)(d), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 
12  Ibid. article 31(1)(d)(ii) 
13  HC 5100/94 
14  Article 34(1) of the Israeli Penal Code 1977 states that an individual ‘will not bear criminal 
liability for committing any act immediately necessary for the purpose of saving the life, liberty, body or 
property, of either himself or his fellow person, from substantial danger of serious harm, imminent from’ 
the circumstances in which he is place, and additionally where ‘alternative means’ are unavailable to avoid 
the harm 
15  J D Ohlin, The bounds of necessity, JICJ 2008, 6(2), 289-308. See also P Westen and J Mangiafico, A 
justification, not an excuse – and why it matters, 6 Buff Crim L Rev 2002-2003 833-950 
16  Article 38(1)(c), Statute of the International Court of Justice states that ‘the general principles of 
law recognized by civilised nations’ form a source of international law. Consequently, they ought to be of 
value when analysing the defence of necessity from a military perspective. 
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issue from a military policy perspective, and as such, the purpose for which the torture is being committed 
is outwith the scope of this paper.17  
The defence of necessity 
The identification of the existence of the defence of necessity can be traced back to the sixteenth century 
writings of the English jurist Francis Bacon,18 who stated that ‘the law chargeth no man with default where 
the act is compulsory, and not voluntary.’19 He divided necessity into three distinct categories: acts which 
were committed necessarily to preserve one’s own life, acts committed through the ‘necessity of obedience’ 
and acts of necessity committed in response to an ‘act of God.’20 He gives several examples of situations 
for which criminal responsibility should be excused where there is threat to life or limb, and also indicates 
that there should be no criminal liability where an individual seeks to avert damage caused by natural 
disasters by damaging property, e.g. by destroying one house to prevent a fire spreading along a terraced 
row.21 Necessity of obedience is defined essentially as acts committed by State diplomats who owe a duty 
of obedience to their State and therefore may be relieved of responsibility for all wrongdoing except 
conspiracy,22 indicating that it may be an early form of State immunity for officials. To invoke the defence 
of necessity, according to Bacon, there should be a direct threat to the life of the individual which compels 
him to act, or he should be compelled to act in response to a natural disaster. There is little ambiguity at 
this point in time of being compelled to act to achieve a certain crucial military objective, such as the 
extraction of information during an interrogation. When examining the problem of torture through the 
lens of his sixteenth-century definition it is clear that there can be no reliance on the defence of necessity 
to justify or excuse coercive interrogational techniques. 
 
To place the defence in the context of causing physical harm to another, and justifying that by arguing that 
it prevented a greater harm, a further development was made during the nineteenth century. In two cases, 
the question of whether or not the defence of necessity should be raised in relation to murder charges was 
discussed. The first, United States v Holmes,23 argued that the defence of necessity should be permitted 
where a sailor had acted to preserve the lives of his passengers by throwing three other passengers 
overboard, to prevent a leaking lifeboat from sinking. The second24 involved two sailors who had killed 
and eaten another member of their crew to prevent them from dying of starvation, where there was no 
hope of rescue. In both cases, the use of the defence to counter a charge of murder was rejected. The 
                                                            
17  See F Jessberger, Bad torture – good torture? What international criminal lawyers may learn from the recent 
trial of police officers in Germnay J.I.C.J. 3 (2005) 1059-1073 
18  F Bacon, The elements of the common lawes of England 1597, republished in 1826 
19  Ibid. at 33 
20  Ibid. at 34 
21  Ibid. 
22  Ibid. 
23  1841 26 F Cas 360 
24  R v Dudley and Stephens (1884-85) LR 14 QBD 273 
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crime itself was considered too serious to ever contemplate allowing such a defence, despite the above 
extreme circumstances clearly invoking the ‘compulsory’ elements of Bacon’s definition25 to avoid greater 
loss of life. In the English case, Lord Coleridge explained that the use of the defence of necessity ‘once 
admitted might be made the legal cloak for unbridled passion and atrocious crime.’26 He then went on to 
state that if a case caused particular hardship to an individual, the Crown prerogative of mercy was 
available under the constitution of the United Kingdom.27 The concept underpinning both rejections is the 
idea that a ‘slippery surface’28 would be created by the admission of such a defence. If the State holds that a 
certain undue harshness has been inflicted by correct application of the law, there is a mechanism to deal 
with this.29 This directly correlates to the idea that there is no defence available for certain crimes 
considered by humanity to be too grievous, in particular those involving direct physical harm to another 
individual. 
There is also direct provision for the defence within different national penal codes. Specifically, the Israeli 
criminal code30 stipulates that an individual ‘will not bear any criminal liability for committing any act 
immediately necessary for the purpose of saving the life, liberty, body or property, of either himself or his 
fellow person, from substantial danger of serious harm, imminent from the circumstances in which he is 
placed.’31 The application of such a defence is broadened to ‘any act immediately necessary’32 rather than 
any necessary or required acts – it is dependent entirely on the circumstances at hand and applies no 
limitation on the conduct which it may involve. It also arguably provides a defence for the violation of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity such as torture, as an act could conceivably constitute one which was 
‘immediately necessary’ should the appropriate circumstances arise. The defence was discussed in an Israeli 
High Court case33 in the context of torture, where the President of the Court held that ‘an act committed 
under conditions of ‘necessity’ does not constitute a crime. Instead it is deemed an act worth committing in 
such circumstances in order to prevent serious harm to a human life or body. We are therefore speaking of 
a deed that society has an interest in encouraging.’34 The precedent set by this case is that Israel Security 
Agency investigators are permitted to rely on the necessity defence, if the coercive interrogational 
techniques they employ lead to criminal charges of torture. As the law has been extended, through the 
domestic penal code,35 to threats both to the individual themselves and to ‘fellow persons’, it is conceivable 
that investigators may be acting to prevent harm to Israeli nationals and therefore meet this requirement. 
The argument here is that within the context of an organised interrogation, there are acts of physical harm 
                                                            
25  Supra n19 
26  Supra  n24 at 288 
27  Ibid. 
28  Y Ginbar, op. cit. at 38. The idea is not necessarily that there would be downward slope thereafter, 
or a ‘slippery slope’ would be created by the inclusion of such a defence, but rather that ‘additional acts 
may have to be justified if one act is justified,’ and therefore it would be more difficult to determine which  
29  See R v Bentley (Deceased)[2001] 1 Cr.App.R. 307 
30  Criminal Code Ordinance 1977, as amended in 1994 
31  op. cit. n29, article 34(1) 
32  Ibid. 
33  Public Committee against Torture v State of Israel H.C. 5100/94 (1999) 
34  Ibid. at 33 
35  Op. cit. n29 
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which would be ‘immediately necessary.’36 Presumably, this is because there is a requirement to 
immediately access information that the individual subject of the interrogation, the means of achieving the 
aim being torture. The idea that the defence of necessity deals with ‘a person’s reaction to a given set of 
facts,’37 underpins the concept that it may be necessary to use torture in certain circumstances.  
 
The necessity of this reaction, of employing methods of torture in order to access the crucial information, 
is defended in the context of military operations: the effectiveness of the methods deployed is not 
considered.38 Since the necessity of the reaction cannot be measured in relation to the achievement of the 
aim, the question then arises as to whether the conduct can be justified, militarily, as necessary or excused 
as necessary. The distinction between the two types of necessity that has been made is important, as a 
justification defence may be available in some circumstances where an excuse is not, and vice versa.39 It is 
also crucial that the distinction is made, for the preservation of the categorisation of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity as such, and also for the proper application of the law. By its very nature, the law 
provides for exigencies: there are certain circumstances in which certain conduct is necessary. However 
that same conduct should not necessarily be justified. It may be more appropriate to excuse criminal 
conduct, where it has been found to be necessary. The distinction between the two types of necessity is 
important when dealing with absolute prohibitions and indefensible conduct, particularly where legal 
authority is in direct conflict with primary legislation. It also assists in ‘grey areas:’ it is on the grey area of 
this distinction, and its potential application, that the next two parts of this paper seek to focus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justifying necessary conduct 
The qualities which distinguish justifications from excuses in the context of necessity have been evaluated 
in different ways. As highlighted by Greenawalt,40 a distinction can be made between the two on the 
grounds of ‘warranted and unwarranted behaviour.’41 Justified necessity is warranted behaviour, the kind 
                                                            
36  As per supra n31 
37  Lord Hope of Craighead, The judges’ dilemma ICLQ 2009 58(4) 753-765 at 758 
38  See J Mayer Whatever it takes, The New Yorker, February 19 2007 at p4, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/02/19/070219fa_fact_mayer?currentPage=1 (correct as of 
21 April 2011) 
39  E Milhizer, Justiciation and excuse: what they were, what they are and what they ought to be 78 St John’s L 
Rev 2004 725-896 at 850-851 
40  K Greenawalt, The perplexing borders of justification and excuse, 84 Colum L Rev 1984 1897-1927 
41  Ibid. at 1903 
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which has been accepted as legal and permissible because of the gain that society stands to make from it. 
Ordinarily, it would be considered wrongful and criminal, but the aim it seeks to achieve dissolves any 
criminal liability associated with the conduct. Other commentators note that if the question ‘did 
society…avoid a net harm by the defendant’s otherwise criminal conduct?’42 can be answered in the 
affirmative, then the conduct can be justified. One commentator43 makes reference to the German Penal 
Code in distinguishing the two branches of necessity.44 It differentiates between justified necessity45 and 
excused necessity,46 stating that those who commit an act ‘in order to avert an imminent danger… (do) not 
act unlawfully if…the interest (they protect) significantly outweighs the interests which (they) harm’47 are 
entitled to the protection of the defence of justified necessity. One caveat applicable to the defence is that 
the means employed ‘must be appropriate…to avert the damage.’48 The three qualities, that of imminent 
danger, the infliction of harm for the protection of an important interest and the exemption from criminal 
responsibility, are mirrored precisely in the necessity defence defined in the Israeli penal code.49  
 
However, neither the judiciary nor the legislature makes any such distinction between justification and 
excuse. Arguably the Israeli defence is that of justification, rather than excuse, as it seeks to decriminalise 
the act rather to admonish the actor. The applicability of this defence to war crimes and crimes against 
humanity such as murder and torture was examined in the ICTY case of Erdemovic.50 The accused 
admitted that he had taken part in the mass murder of Bosnian Muslims as a soldier during the conflict in 
the former Yugoslavia, but raised a defence of necessity. He argued that he had been compelled to murder 
as a result of threats made against his own life and the lives of his wife and child. The Tribunal held, on 
appeal, that ‘no rule may be found in customary international law regarding the availability or the non-
availability of duress as a defence to a charge of killing…The post World War II military tribunals did not 
establish such a rule. We do not think that the decisions of these tribunals constitute consistent and 
uniform state practice underpinned by opinio juris.”51 The Tribunal sitting as an Appeals Chamber rejected 
the applicability of a defence of necessity which could justify, rather than excuse such conduct. 
Interestingly, there was more than one dissenting judgment on the matter.52 Judge Cassese disagreed with 
the opinion of the majority and clarified that the defence should be used in terms of justified rather than 
excused necessity: “acting under a threat from a third person of severe and irreparable harm to life or limb 
entails that no criminal responsibility is incurred by the person acting.”53 He then added that the “legal 
regulation of duress in case of murder…is both realistic and flexible.”54 Although this is a dissenting 
                                                            
42  Milhizer, op. cit. at 851 
43  Ohlin, op cit. 
44  Ibid. at 292 
45  Strafgesetzbuck 1975, s34 
46  See supra n45 s35 
47  See supra n45 s35 
48  See supra n45 s35 
49  See supra n4 
50  See supra n10 
51  See supra n10 at 55 
52  See separate and dissenting opinions of Judge Li, Judge Stephen and Judge Cassese, supra n6 
53  See supra n10,  Cassese dissent at 15 
54  Ibid., at 47 
Dynamiques	Internationales	ISSN	2105-2646	 	 	 	 						Clare	F.	Moran	
Numéro	5	juillet	2011		 	 																																		7 
judgment, it qualifies as opinio juris from an eminent international law judge and professor. It is also relevant 
in the context of a military operation, as the accused was a soldier at the time of the offence. Furthermore, 
the case concerns murder, which is placed on an equal legal footing with torture as both a crime against 
humanity and a war crime. The accused argued that he was compelled to follow orders as a soldier and 
thereby commit murder. Possibly drawing on this judgment, the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (Rome Statute) provides for the defence of necessity as a justification in certain instances. 
Again, it does not seek to excuse the conduct, but rather to exclude criminal liability. For the defence to be 
available, there must be a threat of imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm, and 
the person must be acting necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat.55 
 
The Rome Statute further includes the acts of third parties as potentially necessitating the justifiable 
criminal conduct. Despite this, there is something decidedly uneasy about a defence of justification 
appearing in a Statute regulating the prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Statutes 
of previous international criminal tribunals56 were drafted in response to events which had shocked the 
conscience of humanity. As such, it would have been, at the very least, outright hypocrisy to include any 
justifications within these Statutes. It also sits uncomfortably next to the concept of individual criminal 
responsibility57 - the idea that some acts are so terrible that they can never be justified and individuals must 
bear full responsibility for their commission. However, it is worth noting that the Rome Statute has been 
drafted in anticipation of future war crimes. The lack of immediate victims for these crimes may be reason 
for its inclusion, but it nonetheless a development for the concept of justified necessity in law. 
 
Justified necessity has been analysed by two academics as consisting ‘of careful assessments of the 
appropriateness of an actor’s conduct in light of the alternatives that were available to him.’58 Bacon’s 
initial element of ‘compulsory’59 conduct remains, as well as that of the full exclusion from criminal 
liability. The defence of justified necessity, although initially rejected by each of the Statutes of the IMT 
and the ICTY and subsequent case law thereof as a defence to crimes against humanity and war crimes, has 
now been subsumed by the inclusion of the defence in the Rome Statute.60 The common thread, however, 
remains that there is no recognised international distinction between justified necessity and excused 
necessity, other than in the German Penal Code.61 The initial inclusion, in the Statute of the IMT, of notice 
that ‘the fact that defendant acted in pursuant to an order of his government or of a superior shall not free 
him of responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment’62 indicates that the development 
                                                            
55  Article 31(d), Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 
56  See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal. London, 8 August 1945 (Charter of the 
IMT); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 1991; Statute for the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 1994 
57  Article 25, Rome Statute, originating in article 6, Statute of the IMT 
58  Westen and Mangiafico, op. cit. at 897 
59  Bacon, op. cit. at n19 
60  See supra n34 
61  See supra n45 and n46 
62  Article 8, Charter of the IMT 
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of the defence of justified necessity may have emerged through confusion of the law and precedent. It 
should be considered that crimes against humanity and war crimes are such for a reason: that even during 
military operations, some conduct is beyond the moral pale. As a result, it can never be justified, no matter 
how necessary it may appear to be at that moment in time. Therefore, if such conduct can never be 
justified, may it be excused in some circumstances? This approach does not avoid criminal liability, but 
seeks to mitigate punishment under the circumstances. The next section will look to evaluating the 
availability of the defence of excused necessity in respect of a charge of torture. 
 
Excusing necessary conduct 
The concept of excused necessity can also be found within the German Penal Code,63 which states that 
anyone ‘faced with an imminent danger to life, limb or freedom which cannot otherwise be averted, 
commits an unlawful act…acts without guilt.’64 It differs from justifying the conduct because the act itself 
remains illegal. As was noted by Robinson in his study of criminal law defences, ‘acts are justified and 
actors are excused.’65 The German Penal Code’s defence of excused necessity66 supports this assertion by 
freeing the actor from criminality, rather than the act. In Robinson’s study, he identifies four conditions 
which will allow behaviour to be excused by society: firstly, where the actor understands what he is doing, 
secondly, where he understands the “physical consequences” of the act, thirdly, where he understands the 
wrongfulness and unlawfulness of the act and lastly, where he lacks the ability to control the conduct.67 
This lack of ability to control oneself, argues Robinson, is the reason as to why it is ‘no longer proper to 
hold him accountable for it.’68 However, no degree of accountability is discerned: the individual’s 
punishment is not mitigated, but rather he is absolved of all guilt. This is again a slight confusion of the 
idea of an excuse, as it should mitigate punishment rather than justify conduct through a disabling factor in 
the individual’s judgment. There should be no question within the idea of excuse of absolving the 
individual from all criminal responsibility, as the conduct should be clearly defined as wrong, yet difficult to 
avoid under the specific circumstances. The circumstances, relevant to a defence of excused necessity, 
point to an idea that there was no reasonable alternative. It should not justify wrongful conduct. 
 
Another academic argument69 is that ‘an actor is excused if, though he engages in the most heinous of war 
crimes, he nonetheless suffers from a defect of perception…or a defect in capacity for rational 
                                                            
63  See supra n46 
64  Ibid. 
65  P Robinson, Criminal law defenses: A systematic analysis, Colum. L R 82 (2) 199-291 1982 
66  See supra n46 
67  Ibid. at 222 
68  Ibid. 
69  Westen and Mangiafico, op. cit.  
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behaviour…that negates his having the malevolence, callousness, or heedlessness that renders a malefactor 
an appropriate object of public resentment.’70 
This lack of evil intent, as opposed to intentional conduct, is what differentiates excused necessity from 
that of justified necessity. It is also what makes excused necessity more relevant in relation to war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, and more in line with the development of the defence of necessity through 
the jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals.71 
 
The case of Erdemovic72 demonstrates the understanding in the international tribunals that, in relation to 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, excuses can often be relevant in relation to punishment. While the 
court rejected the defence of necessity outright, with the dissents arguing that it may be relevant, no 
distinction was drawn between necessity and excuse. The Cassese dissent73 discussed the idea that necessity 
may be available as a defence to murder,74 but did not develop the discussion as to whether it should 
relieve criminal responsibility or simply mitigate punishment. The legal precedent suggests that there 
should never be any justification for any war crimes or crimes against humanity – there is some conduct 
which is simply too serious to be regarded as acceptable even under the most extreme of circumstances. 
However, there is potential to develop the idea that an individual may be excused of full responsibility as a 
result of the circumstances in which they have been placed. This idea of mitigating punishment may have 
been the basis for Judge Cassese’s dissent in the Erdemovic case, where the conduct is still acknowledged 
as wrongful, but the actor could be excused of full responsibility as a result of the circumstances.  
 
Academic argument suggests that this acknowledgement of the distinction between excuse and justification 
within the defence of necessity may have great benefit for the prosecution of crimes such as torture, and 
may even contribute to the support for the ban in international law on torture. Ohlin comments that ‘by 
recognizing that torture can conceivably be excused – but never justified – the criminal law may reinforce 
the general prohibition against torture as standing outside the bounds of justified necessity.’75 This 
argument draws the distinction between the two types of necessity and argues that justified necessity is not 
appropriate as a defence for war crimes or crimes against humanity. However, it distances the idea of 
excused necessity from that of justified necessity and allows the former to mitigate punishment in respect 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity. This proposition is particularly attractive because it does not 
avoid individual criminal responsibility,76 a key concept in the development of the prosecution of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, and retains the idea that the conduct is wrongful under any 
circumstances. Cassese’s dissent, again, hints at the idea that such a defence may be permissible under 
international law. 
 
                                                            
70  Ibid. at 897-898 
71  See Erdemovic, supra n10 
72  See supra n10 
73  See supra n53 
74  Ibid. 
75  Ohlin, op. cit. at 308 
76  Article 6, Charter of the IMT 
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However, the argument that the international ban on torture and similar war crimes and crimes against 
humanity would be strengthened through the availability of the defence of excused necessity is 
fundamentally flawed. The central problem is that any defence to these crimes would automatically create a 
degree of permissibility in their commission, which ultimately would cause a weakness within any 
prohibition or illegality as the law currently stands. The distinction between excused and justified conduct 
is important, as the defence of necessity should encompass both aspects in order to truly reflect what 
necessity means. The inclusion of the defence of necessity within the Rome Statute77 further supports the 
argument that the distinction should be made clearer in order to encompass the circumstances which can 
arise during wartime. However, it is the application of these defences specifically to war crimes and crimes 
against humanity which is most troubling. The international ban on such conduct emerged from a specific 
point in history where the need was recognised for accountability to humanity in respect of certain 
violations – certain conduct is so offensive, that the commission of an act which harms one individual 
affects us all as humanity. Examining certain situations and justifying this conduct, where there have been 
two further tribunals in the past twenty years for the prosecution of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity is clearly unacceptable and has no legal basis. 
 
The idea of excused necessity, however, is more discreetly objectionable and, owing to the lack of primary 
legal authority on the distinction, there is less of a legal basis on which to accept or reject the defence. 
However, the initial categorisation of these crimes was to prevent their commission and punish any future 
breaches, regardless of circumstance. Naturally there will be cases where the reasons behind an individual’s 
involuntary conduct, such as Erdemovic,78 will mean that that court is sympathetic to the problem. This 
does not mean, however, that there is any defence to what the individual has done. There should be no 
principle in law which states that crimes against humanity or war crimes can ever be excused. That is a 
fundamental tenet of international criminal law and it should remain so. As Melhizer79 noted, ‘excuse 
is…far more imprecise than is justification because free will, the sine qua non of excuse, is not susceptible to 
empirical measurement and, in some sense, can never be determined with the same type of objective 
confidence as can justification.’80 The added flexibility of this defence is precisely why it should not be 
available to defend the commission of crimes against humanity and war crimes. 
 
The importance of the distinction for the military 
When formulating policies and making decisions from the centre of an organisation, it is of particular 
importance that the instructions which are cascaded are clear. No less clear should the legal reasoning 
                                                            
77  See supra n11 
78  See supra n10 
79  Milhizer op. cit. 
80  Ibid. at 850 
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behind policies, which is of great importance in order to secure military legitimacy. The idea that inter armas 
silent leges81 should be firmly consigned to the past, to be replaced with the modern criminal law concepts of 
individual criminal responsibility and accountability for the most heinous of crimes, whether committed 
during times of peace or war. However, modern law also recognises that certain defences may be raised in 
respect of different crimes. The inclusion of a defence of necessity is now common throughout national 
penal codes, although the distinction between two different types of necessity is still only made 
infrequently. The current consensus on necessity defences, reflected by the Israeli Penal Code and the 
Rome Statute seems to focus on the idea that in certain instances conduct is justified as a result of the 
circumstances in which the actor finds himself. There is no question of mitigating punishment or reducing 
responsibility, the idea is rather to exclude liability as a result of the circumstances. Even then, there are 
elements of both aspects of the defences which have been mixed in both the domestic Penal Codes and 
through the Rome Statute. As a result of this conflation, it is vital that the military who will be making the 
policy decisions and ultimately determining the level of acceptable conduct of their personnel, understand 
the distinction between the two types of necessity.  
 
The issue of necessity is particularly important for the military as a whole, and the aspect of it defending its 
conduct in particular. It is recognised that the military have special responsibility in respect of the number 
of individuals who are under its command and the unique position of those individuals means that they are 
likely to experience stress to a degree unknown in a civilian context.82 As such, to protect them and those 
in their custody, it is critically important that there is a secure legal framework within which acts can be 
commissioned, without problems arising from the potential application of individual criminal 
responsibility. Policies should be uniform and should protect the soldiers as agents of the State. It is 
therefore the military’s responsibility to understand the defence of necessity and its applicability (or lack 
thereto) in respect of crimes against humanity and war crimes. Separating the concept of necessity into two 
distinct branches, justified necessity and excused necessity, assists when attempt to reason why certain 
conduct can never be exempted or the punishment for it mitigated. In the context of war, some acts can be 
justified. Other acts may also be excused. However, within this, there are some categories of crimes for 
which there can never be any mitigation or exclusion. Committing acts of torture or murder is always 
wrong, regardless of the aim that doing so seeks to achieve.  
 
The proposition that ‘there is no rule of human jettison’83 helpfully assists in explaining why there is always 
criminal responsibility for certain acts. Crimes against humanity and war crimes, such as murder and 
torture, fall into this category. The application of both branches of the defence should therefore be 
rejected in respect of such crimes. It is not appropriate to exclude criminal responsibility for such crimes, 
given that this would strike right at the heart of the purpose for which they were so categorised. 
Furthermore, it is equally unacceptable to propone the idea that there should be any mitigation of 
                                                            
81  Cicero, Pro Milone 16, republished by Havard University Press, 1972 
82  O Olusanya, Excuse and mitigation under international criminal law: redrawing conceptual boundaries, 13 
New Crim. L Rev. 23-89 2010 
83  B Cardozo, Law and literature and other essays and addresses, New York, 1931 at 113 
Dynamiques	Internationales	ISSN	2105-2646	 	 	 	 						Clare	F.	Moran	
Numéro	5	juillet	2011		 	 																																		12 
punishment. The categorical prohibition of torture, in particular, in international law would undoubtedly be 
weakened as a result, by allowing a lesser punishment to be given where the individual charged argues that 
he tortured out of necessity. The defence of excused necessity would therefore create a loophole in the law 
if it were to be extended to crimes against humanity and war crimes, such as murder and torture. This was 
not the intended purpose of categorising these crimes as such. 
 
Conclusion 
It is of crucial importance that the issue of torture remains a high priority for the military in relation to 
both policy and the conduct of its personnel. The approval offered by the former U.S. President George 
W. Bush of the use of coercive interrogation techniques creates more legal clouds around the issue, 
particularly when his instructions are contrasted with international law on the matter.84 Further confusion 
awaits when the legal authority applying the law is examined, which makes reference to ex post facto 
defences seeking to legitimise the use of torture through dissolution of criminal liability. Specifically, the 
defence of necessity was held by the Israeli High Court to constitute a defence to a charge of torture made 
in respect of a Security Agency investigator, if one was found to be using illegal coercive interrogational 
techniques during investigations. However, this defence is not necessarily appropriate in respect of a 
charge of torture. The rejection by the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment85 that torture can ever be justified refutes the idea that a defence of 
necessity is available. 
 
However, academic comment on the issue suggests the defence of necessity should be divided into two 
parts: justification and excuse. Justifying the use of torture would never be in compliance with international 
law, however there is no comment on the use of the defence of excused necessity for the commission of 
torture. It is important to recognise the distinction between the two in order to create appropriate policies 
which are legally compliant and do not create further problems. It could be argued, at first glance, that the 
defence of necessity is available in respect of crimes against humanity or war crimes, relying on the Israeli 
High Court case as authority. However, an examination of this case leads to the conclusion that it is, in 
fact, a justification defence which would possibly not be available in other jurisdictions. Internationally, the 
Rome Statute provides for a form of the justification defence, but again this is not necessarily in 
compliance with the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, an internationally binding treaty.  
 
Jurisprudence from the ICTY suggests that a form of excuse may be available to mitigate punishment, and 
this is supported by various academic sources. However, this paper contends that the distinction should be 
                                                            
84  See supra n3 
85  See supra n3 
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made for one purpose only: to clarify the international prohibition. Any acceptance of a defence in respect 
of crimes against humanity and war crimes, such as murder and torture, would be completely contrary to 
the aim of an international ban on such conduct. Rather than reinforcing such a prohibition, encouraging 
the supply of a form of defence, whether of necessity or otherwise, would imply that there are certain 
circumstances in which the commission of these crimes is not as damaging as others. This is, primarily, a 
further offence to the victims, but also damaging from a military perspective. The purpose of abiding by 
international laws and prohibitions on certain conduct is to reinforce the idea of military legitimacy, that 
the aim sought to be achieved is being achieved through legal means. The supply of any such defences, it is 
argued, would not necessarily encourage the commission of crimes of torture and murder. Rather, it would 
destroy the idea that military conduct has limits. These limits should be respected by all, to prevent abuse 
and to entrench legitimacy, both outwith and within military organisations. 
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